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Recently Wo´jcik has analyzed the security of the ’ping-pong’ quantum communication proto-
col[1] in the case of considerable quantum channel losses and accordingly an undetectable eaves-
dropping scheme and possible improvements on the ’ping-pong’ protocol are proposed [2]. This
is true. Moreover, according to the analysis on the mutual information I as a function of the
transmission efficiency η of the quantum channel, Wo´jcik concludes that the ’ping-pong’ protocol
is not secure for η < 60%. The aim of this Comment is to point out that the conclusion is not
reliable.
From the figure 4 in Wo´jcik’s paper, one can see that when η = 0, both IAB (the mutual
information between two legitimate users, say, Alice as the message sender and Bob as the message
receiver) and IAE (the mutual information between Alice and the eavesdropper Eve) are nonzero
and IAE is larger than IAB. This means that even if no message is transmitted by Alice, both Eve
and Bob still get some information from Alice, and Eve gets more information than Bob. This is
unimaginable.
In Wo´jcik’s paper, the theoretical IAE(IAB) is always 0.311 (0.189 after the symmetrization).
In Wo´jcik’s scheme (a realistic scheme, where the number of the transmitted bits should be finite),
due to Eve’s attacks, Eve’s (Bob’s) final bits can not be predicted deterministically. Alternatively,
for a certain batch of Alice’s bits, provided that Eve’s attacks are given, different batches of bits
can be obtained by Eve (Bob) with different possibilities in theory. Since the batches of Eve’s
(Bob’s) bits are not unique in theory, and generally speaking, different batches of bits should lead
to different mutual information, hence in the scheme the mutual information between Alice and
Eve (Bob) should not be unique in theory too. This can be easily verified by a simple example as
follows. Let ’u’ (’s’) be Eve’s attack without (with) the symmetry operation. Assume Alice’s bits
are ’100110’ and Eve’s attacks are ’susuus’. According to Wo´jcik’s scheme, taking advantage of
the following conditional probability distributions:
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in theory Eve might get any one of the following batches: ’100110’, ’100111’, ’100100’,
’100101’, ’100010’, ’100011’, ’100000’, ’100001’,’101100’, ’101101’, ’101110’, ’101111’, ’101000’,
’101001’,’101010’ and ’101011’. The possibility, the QBER and the mutual information for each
batch of bits are shown in Table 1.
2Table 1 Possibility, QBER, mutual information for Eve’s possible batches of bits.
Eve’s bits possibility QBER IAE
’100110’ 1/16 0 1
’100111’ 1/16 1/6 0.459
’100100’ 1/16 1/6 0.459
’100101’ 1/16 1/3 0.082
’100010’ 1/16 1/6 0.459
’100011’ 1/16 1/3 0.082
’100000’ 1/16 1/3 0.134
’100001’ 1/16 1/3 0.093
’101100’ 1/16 1/3 0.082
’101101’ 1/16 1/2 0
’101110’ 1/16 1/6 0.459
’101111’ 1/16 1/3 0.093
’101000’ 1/16 1/2 0
’101001’ 1/16 2/3 0.082
’101010’ 1/16 1/3 0.082
’101011’ 1/16 1/2 0
Alice’s bits are ’100110’. Eve’s attacks are ’susuus’.
The transmission efficiency η is assumed to be not greater than 50%.
To summarize, there must be mistakes in Wo´jcik’s calculations of the mutual information. Con-
cluding, the security estimation based on the wrong mutual information is not reliable anymore.
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